Discovery of an Attorney’s Work Product in Subsequent Litigation by Tackabery, Neal E.
NOTES
DISCOVERY OF AN ATTORNEY'S WORK PRODUCT
IN SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION
Over the course of the past decade, the federal courts, in a series
of cases, have been faced with the question of whether to allow dis-
covery of materials prepared by an attorney in preparation for prior
litigation. While these materials-denoted attorney's work product1
-are, under the doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor,2 protected from
discovery in the case for which they are prepared, the courts have
reached conflicting decisions as to whether such materials merit con-
tinued work product protection in later actions. This Note will discuss
the rationale for affording any special protection to a lawyer's work
product; examine, in the light of this rationale, the various approaches
the courts have taken in dealing with discovery of work product in sub-
sequent litigation; and propose a test for determining when a lawyer's
work product from a prior case should be discoverable.
The Development of Liberal Discovery
Discovery is "the process by which a party obtains. . . informa-
tion and other materials relevant to a pending lawsuit."3 The purposes
of discovery are to delineate clearly the issues in the case, to ensure
that all relevant evidence will be made available to the trier of fact,
and to encourage pretrial settlement of claims.4 Prior to 1938, dis-
1. A brief definition of "work product" may be found in note 15 infra.
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
I. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MooRE];
C. WiRwT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRA CtCE AND PROCEDURE (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRirr & MILLER];
Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MIIN. L. REv. 1269 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Cooper];
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HIv. L. REv. 940 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
2. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See note 15 and notes 23-63 infra and accompanying
text.
3. Developments 942.
4. See id. at 944-46. Discovery enables parties to determine the issues on which
they are in agreement and which issues are effectively out of the case (because of one
party's inability to meet his burden of proof), thereby enabling each party to devote
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covery was severely limited in the federal courts.' In actions at law,
depositions could be taken under certain circumstances in order to per-
petuate testimony, but not for discovery purposes;6 in equity, deposi-
tions could be taken upon a showing of exceptional cause,7 as well
as to perpetuate testimony, 8 and written interrogatories were available
by means of a cumbersome procedure known as a bill of discovery.9
At both law and equity, the federal provisions for discovery were gen-
erally inferior to those in the state courts.10
In 1938, however, law and equity were merged and discovery
was liberalized when the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." The new Federal Rules provided a number of
his efforts to the points of actual dispute. Furthermore, if each party knows the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of his opponent's case, he will be in a better position
to evaluate rationally the merits of pretrial settlement.
5. See generally 4 MOORE % 26.03; Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery:
A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 424, 437-52 (1937).
6. Two types of depositions were in use. A deposition de bene esse could be
taken if the witness might be unavailable at trial for one of five different reasons.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88, as amended, Act of May 9, 1892, ch.
146, 17 Stat. 89.
A deposition could be taken under a dedimus potestatem when it was "necessary
to prevent a failure or delay of justice." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat.
88. See 4 MOORE 26.03[1].
The bill of discovery, see note 9 infra and accompanying text, was available as
an action brought in equity for discovery in aid of an action at law, but only in excep-
tional circumstances. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F.
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); 4 MoORE 26.02[1], at 26-80; 4A MooREe 33.0311].
7. Equity R. 47, 226 U.S. 661 (1912).
8. The deposition in perpetuam rei memoriam could be authorized in order to pre-
vent a loss of testimony for purposes of a pending action. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88. See 4 MOORE 27.02.
9. Equity R. 58, 226 U.S. 665 (1912).
10. Developments 950. The Conformity Act of 1872 had provided that the federal
courts should apply "as near as may be" the procedure governing actions at law in the
states in which they were located. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197.
However, this provision was construed to mean that only the method of taking deposi-
tions could be borrowed from the state courts, implying that the devices for "discov-
ery" provided under federal law were exclusive. Hanks Dental Ass'n v. International
Tooth Crown Co., 194 U.S. 303 (1904). See Developments 949-51, for a short history
of pre-1938 discovery procedure.
11. In 1934, Congress passed the Rule-making Act which gave the Supreme Court
power to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal district courts and, in particular,
to unite law and equity. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064. On
June 3, 1935, the Court appointed the "Advisory Committee" to draft the rules, 295
U.S. 774-75 (1935), and on December 20, 1937, the Court promulgated the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 302 U.S. 783 (1937). The Rules were reported to Congress and, in
accordance with rule 86, became effective (three months after Congress' "adjournment")
on September 16, 1938. lB MooR .523[5].
See generally 1B MOORE .501-.528 for a history of federal rule-making.
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discovery devices12 for securing information or material "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action."13  The unrestricted
nature of these new discovery techniques resulted in unforeseen dif-
ficulties. While the discovery provisions mandated complete disclos-
ure, the characteristics of the adversary system were such that an at-
torney was reluctant to reveal anything to his opponent, especially the
fruits of his own labor.14 Consequently, demands for discovery of
materials prepared by an attorney in preparation for trial-the attor-
ney's work product 5-did not go unchallenged.
Before 1947, the cases dealing with a lawyer's trial-preparation
materials were inconsistent both in their holdings and in their analy-
ses.' 6 The majority of courts denied discovery, though on a variety
12. F D. R. Crv. P. 26-37. Rule 26, in its present form, is a general provision
which outlines the methods and scope of discovery. Rules 27-32 govern the taking of
depositions upon oral examination or written questions. Rule 33 provides for written
interrogatories to parties, and rule 34 permits the production of documents and entry
upon land for inspection. Rule 35 makes provision for mental or physical examination
of parties, and rule 36 governs requests for admissions. Rule 37 provides sanctions for
failure to grant discovery.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance in this context is not limited to mate-
rials relevant to the merits of the action. It extends to preparatory materials also. See
4 MooRE IT 26.56[l], at 26-117.
14. See Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery of Expert's and Attorney's Work Product, 17
WAYNE L. Rnv. 1145, 1149 (1971). Complete disclosure appears inconsistent with the
effective functioning of the adversary system. See Cooper 1275. In fact, much of the
value of some devices of trial strategy is thought to be in surprise. Id. at 1295. Cf.
LaFrance, Work-Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 DICK. L. Rav. 351, 369 (1964).
("The Court's desire in Hickman to protect attorneys seems to be based on one prem-
ise. The premise is that an attorney prepares for trial only to surprise his adversary.")
It might be argued that complete disclosure would simply move trial tactics out
of the courtroom back to the discovery stage of the litigation. That is, each counsel
would learn his opponent's contentions, both legal and factual, and his proposed tactics,
to such an extent that the only function of the trial itself would be to lay the matter
before the trier of fact for a final decision. But such a process might easily lead to
complete cooperation between counsel, a practice arguably inconsistent with the concept
of adversariness which underlies much of the Anglo-American legal system.
15. Technically, work product is whatever preparatory materials are protected un-
der the decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See notes 23-63 infra
and accompanying text. The Hickman opinion does provide a general description of
what might constitute work product:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the lawyer] assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference . . . . This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways. Id. at 511.
16. Between the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 and the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), there were more than
sixty decisions dealing with the work product issue. See 4 MooRE 26.63[4]. The
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of different groundsyT At least one court noted the possible detri-
mental effect of discovery on the lawyer-client relationship and there-
fore accorded the lawyer's work the status of privileged material, that
is, not subject to discovery under any circumstances.' s According to
another view, however, the policy of the Federal Rules that cases
should be decided on the basis of all the facts required unlimited dis-
covery.19 Because of this uncertainty, -the Advisory Committee on
term "work product" itself apparently was not used until the circuit opinion in Hick-
man, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945). Evidently the phrase was coined in oral argument,
as the court said:
This was talked about as the "work product of the lawyer" in the argument
of the case. This is a phrase which seems pretty well to describe what we
are after, though we hesitate to adopt it as a label for our concept for fear
that it may contain implications not now apparent to us. It does with fair
accuracy describe what we are excluding here under the term privilege. Id.
at 223.
17. Some courts held the matter sought nondiscoverable because it would not be
admissible into evidence. See, e.g., Matthies v. Peter F. Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D. 277
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) (hearsay testimony cannot be taken in a deposition); Poppino v.
Jones Store Co., 1 F.R.D. 215, 217 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (same holding); Kenealy v.
Texas Co., 29 F. Supp. 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (statements made after the accident
do not constitute material evidence). One court, in an often quoted statement, said
that to permit discovery of such materials "would penalize the diligent and place a pre-
mium on laziness," a result the drafters of the discovery provisions did not intend.
McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Still others held that
any matter obtained after the commencement of the action should not be subject to
discovery. See, e.g., Stanley Works v. C.S. Mersick & Co., 1 F.R.D. 43, 46 (D. Conn.
1939); Murphy v. New York & Puerto Rico S.S. Co., 27 F. Supp. 878, 880 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). Contra, Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D. 300, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1943)
(to make such a distinction between statements obtained before suit began and those
obtained thereafter would be illogical). For a discussion of the cases prior to Hick-
man, see Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
reported in 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-60 (1946); 4 MooRE 26.63[4]; 8 WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 2021.
The Rules now make it clear that "[lt is not ground for objection that the infor-
mation sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Furthermore, no distinction can properly be made between materials ob-
tained before commencement of the action and those obtained later. See Stix Prods.,
Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ownby
v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 989, 990 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Taine, Discovery of Trial
Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COLuM. L. Rnv. 1026, 1039-41 (1950).
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 808,
vacated, 328 U.S. 876 (1946), aff'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See als6
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 6 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
19. See Seligson v. Camp Westover, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also
Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd on other grounds, 318 U.S.
109 (1943), where the court said:
Some lawyers also grumble, saying that it is "unfair" that a lawyer .
should be obliged to let counsel for the adversary scrutinize his data. But
. . . "unfairness" to a diligent lawyer is of no importance as against much-
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Rules for Civil Procedure20 proposed an amendment to the Federal
Rules which provided conditional protection to writings prepared in
anticipation of litigation and absolute privilege to any writings that re-
flected an attorney's mental processes. 21  The Supreme Court, however,
failed to adopt this amendment, choosing instead to promulgate its
solution in the form of a judicial opinion.22
Hickman v. Taylor
The issue decided by Hickman v. Taylor2 3 arose when the admin-
istrator of the estate of one of the deceased crew members of a sunken
tugboat brought suit under the Jones Act24 and sought discovery of
written statements taken from the survivors of the mishap by counsel
for the defendant ship company and memoranda prepared by the
needed improvement in judicial ascertainment of the "facts" of cases ....
Id. at 997 (dictum).
20. The original Advisory Committee was appointed by the Supreme Court only
to draft the initial Federal Rules. See note 11 supra. In 1942, however, the Court
appointed as many of the surviving members of the original committee "as [were]
willing to serve" on a continuing Advisory Committee "to advise the Court with respect
to proposed amendments or additions to the Rules of Civil Procedure. . . ." 314 U.S.
720 (1942). Later, pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing continuous study of
the Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970), the Chief Justice appointed a Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to which the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure would report regarding proposed amendments. Eventually,
the Court must approve the amendments. See 1B MooRE f .529 (1973 Supp.).
21. The amendment provided for the addition of the following two sentences to
former rule 30(b):
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained
or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent
in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that de-
nial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the
production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him
undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the production or in-
spection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule
35, the conclusions of an expert.
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, supra note 17, at 456-57. Note the
similarity between this proposal and rule 26(b)(3) adopted twenty-four years later.
The text of rule 26(b) (3) is set out in note 65 infra.
22. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Why the Court preferred to make
its pronouncement in an opinion rather than by adopting the amendment is a matter
of speculation. From a practical point of view, a judicial opinion would seem to be
a better medium in which to fully develop the new standard and the rationale behind
it. Furthermore, by the time that the final version of the proposed amendment had
been reported to the Supreme Court (June 1946, 1B Moou- 1 .525[1]), the Court had
already decided to hear the case (May 27, 1946). 328 U.S. 876, vacating 327 U.S.
808 (1946). Thus, it was appropriate to defer consideration of the amendment. See
Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work
Product of the Lawyer, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 498, 507 (1958).
23. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
24. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
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same attorney from interviews of other witnesses.2" Plaintiff's lawyer
frankly admitted that he wanted the statements "only to help prepare
himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked
nothing."2 6  When defendant's counsel refused to obey the order of
the district court to produce them,27 he was adjudged in criminal con-
tempt. On appeal,28 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed on the ground that the information sought was privileged.29 In
one of the most significant decisions involving the Federal Rules, the
Supreme Court affirmed. However, the Court clearly rejected the idea
that the attorney-client privilege8" might apply in such circumstances.8"
Nevertheless, Justice Murphy, in his majority opinion, asserted that
[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwar-
25. Defendant's counsel took statements from the survivors between one and two
months after the accident. He also interviewed other persons and in some instances
made memoranda of what he learned. Plaintiff brought suit more than eight months
after the accident and, by interrogatories, sought production of both the statements and
the memoranda. At that time, the witnesses were still available, and their testimony
taken at an investigatory hearing within one month after the accident was on record.
329 U.S. at 498-99.
See Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403, 408-13 (1946), where the
Hickman case is discussed just prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court. De-
fendant's counsel, Samuel Fortenbaugh, gives his own account of the facts there.
26. 329 U.S. at 513.
27. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 808, vacated, 328 U.S. 876 (1946), aff'd on other
grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
28. The appeal was taken from the contempt judgment. Appeal was allowed be-
cause under federal procedure that judgment was a final order. See Hickman v. Taylor,
153 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 808, vacated, 328 U.S. 876
(1946), affd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See note 95 infra.
29. [There is] a feeling on the part of judges that "privilege" as the term
is used in the Federal Rules and "privilege" as one finds the term in the law
of evidence as a ground for excluding testimony are not identical. We agree.
We are clear in our own minds . . .that "privilege" as used in the Rules
comprehends the material asked for in the interrogatory . . .namely, memo-
randa of talks with witnesses, signed statements made by witnesses, the law-
yer's recollection of talks with witnesses. 153 F.2d at 222-23.
30. Wigmore gives the following definition of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection may be waived. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALs
AT ComrnvoN LAw § 2292 (1961).
31. 329 U.S. at 508: "We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental
impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis."
The materials sought fell outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege because
they did not relate to communications between attorney and client; rather, they related
to communications between attorney and witnesses.
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ranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attor-
ney.
.. . Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy;
without undue and needless interference. 32
The Court went on to qualify this conclusion:
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or pre-
pared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are neces-
sarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and non-privi-
leged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production
of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery
may properly be had. 33
With regard to the written statements, the Court determined that while
the Rules gave the trial judge sufficient discretion to deal with the
problem, "a naked, general demand for these materials as of right...
was insufficient -to justify discovery under these circumstances. .... 
The Court went further, however, with regard to the oral statements
made to defendant's counsel:
,[W]hether presently in the form of his mental impressions or memor-
anda, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be made
under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production ....
. . . If there should be a rare situation justifying production of
these matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.35
Thus, Hickman made clear that some materials prepared by a
lawyer in anticipation of litigation will be "prima facie" protected from
discovery.3 6 However, it is also clear that if the inquiring party makes
a showing of "good cause, ' 37 these materials will lose their protection.
32. Id. at 510-11.
33. Id. at 511. Because of the record from the investigatory hearing and the con-
tinuing availability of witnesses, the plaintiff's lawyer could hardly argue that the mate-
rial that he sought was essential. See note 25 supra.
34. Id. at 512.
35. Id. at 512-13.
36. Developments 1029.
37. Prior to the 1970 amendments, "good cause" in this context was referred to
as "extra good cause" to distinguish it from the "good cause" requirement of rule 34
dealing with the production of documents. See Cooper 1273. The 1970 amendments
eliminated "good cause" from rule 34 because of the confusion it created. See Advi-
sory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, reported in 48 F.R.D. 487, 526-27
(1970). The amendments also codified the standard for discovery of work product in
rule 26(b)(3). See note 65 infra. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 1156-57;
Note, Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 CoLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBLEMS 623, 628 (1972).
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The Hickman Rationale
Despite this Supreme Court pronouncement, the courts have con-
tinued to reach conflicting decisions, 38 though perhaps the range of
disagreement has been narrowed. This conflict can probably be attri-
buted to an uncertainty about the rationale underlying the Hickman
decision. 9 To discern that rationale, it is helpful to examine the ana-
lytic framework adopted by the Hickman Court.
The Court's objective was presumably to facilitate the just and
efficient functioning of our judicial system.48 In furtherance of this
goal, the Federal Rules had contemplated full disclosure of information
between the parties to a lawsuit.41 But complete disclosure, the Court
asserted, would impede the functioning of counsel42 by blunting the ad-
versariness that is inherent in the judicial system. 43 Therefore, the
Court suggested an equation to balance these competing interests."
On one side of the equation is the need to accommodate the adversary
system by protecting certain materials prepared by a lawyer in anti-
cipation of litigation; the "weight" to be attached to this interest may
be seen as varying with one's assessment of the extent to which greater
discovery will cause undesirable consequences to the adversary system.
38. Compare Alitmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950) (construing
ADMI1ALTY RULES 31 & 32, which are counterparts to FED. R. Civ. P. 33 & 34; mate-
rials procured by persons under the direction of counsel in preparation for trial are pro-
tected as work product) with E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959) (work product rule applies only when the lawyer gath-
ered the materials in preparation for trial). Compare United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 34 F.R.D. 241 (E.D. Mo. 1963) (in civil antitrust suit, responses to ques-
tionnaires are protected where they contain confidential business data) with Seven-Up
Co. v. Get Up Corp., 30 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (in action for trademark in-
fringement, responses made in interviews concerning trademark confusion are discover-
able).
39. See Cooper 1272 ("the opinion consists of a vague amalgam of references to
'injustice' and 'hardship'"); LaFrance, supra note 14, at 366 ("the Court did not define
work product adequately"); Comment, Basic Survey of Work Product in Federal and
State Jurisdictions in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 35 TENN. L. REv. 474, 495
(1968) (the difficulty lies in "defining the exact nature and scope of the work product
doctrine").
40. The Federal Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The Hickman Court, in refer-
ring to the role of the lawyer in the judicial system, used such phrases as "the orderly
prosecution and defense of legal claims," 329 U.S. at 510, "to promote justice," id. at
511, and "an orderly working of our system of legal procedure," id. at 512.
41. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
43. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. Presumably, litigation in an ad-
versary context contributes just as much to effective truthseeking as would free discov-
ery.
44. 329 U.S. at 510-14.
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On the other side is the policy of the Rules for disclosure; the "weight"
of this interest will vary with the need of the inquiring litigant for the
information. As one court stated:
The privilege of the lawyer's work product and the showing of good
cause sufficient to overcome it are interdependent, and when, as here,
the factors supporting the claim of privilege are weak, the requisite
showing of good cause is correspondingly lessened. 45
The equation thus permits as much disclosure as is consistent with
the adversary system's need for privacy. In determining how much
disclosure to allow, the greatest difficulty lies in ascertaining what con-
sequences will flow from unrestricted discovery, and how deleterious
those consequences will be. The Hickman Court merely assumed that
certain undesirable effects would, in fact, occur.46  Since the commen-
tators disagree as to what, if any, consequences non-protection of work
product might have,4 7 and not all courts have accepted the Supreme
Court's assertion that detrimental effects would actually result from
unlimited discovery,48 it will be helpful, before reaching a conclusion
45. United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1959). See also
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aJ'd by an
equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971): "IT]he less the lawyer's 'mental proc-
esses' are involved, the less will be the burden to show good cause." Id. at 492.
46. Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness
and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and
in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would
be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would
be poorly served. 329 U.S. at 511.
47. Some commentators remain faithful to the Hickman opinion and contend that
protection should be granted to work product in order to avoid deterrence of adequate
preparation. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
One commentator has denied that the consequences of unrestricted discovery ex-
pressed in Hickman are realistic factors to be considered. See Cooper 1276-82. He
maintained that the danger of free discovery lies in the effect it would have on the
trial itself: "[P]erfect knowledge of every item of proof and argument . . . would
often result ... in a development of position and response calculated to impede rather
than advance the search for . . . truth . . . ." Id. at 1275. This naturally led him
to the conclusion that the major concern of the work product doctrine should be the
protection of trial tactics. Id. at 1275, 1296. But cf. Saunders v. United States, 316
F.2d 346, 350 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("It may be true that the work product rule re-
flects considerations other than maintaining the privacy of the attorney's thoughts and
trial tactics.")
Another commentator has urged that Hickman was wrongly decided and that noth-
ing other than privileged material should be immune from discovery. See LaFrance,
supra note 14.
48. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 129 (5th Cir. 1968) ("It is
not likely that defendants in accident cases will cease taking statements simply to avoid
discovery"); American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d
277 (2d Cir. 1967) (discovery of witness statements allowed). "There is . . . the
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about the appropriate interpretation of Hickman, to examine some of
the rationales that have been suggested as underlying the holding in
that case.
First, it has been suggested that discovery of a lawyer's pretrial
preparation materials might discourage him from "exerting his fullest
efforts to develop his client's case."'49  The theory is that a lawyer,
fearing the discovery of evidence that he might uncover supporting
his adversary's case, might curtail his investigation with respect to cer-
tain issues. Those who reject this conclusion argue that a lawyer must
know the strengths and weaknesses of his case for settlement purposes
and dare not risk going to trial unprepared.50 It would seem, how-
ever, that the real fear is not that a lawyer will be totally unprepared
to present his client's case, but rather that there is a possibility that
he will be discouraged from expending the last increment of effort
that should be characteristic of the adversary system and of a profes-
sionally responsible bar.
Another analysis assumes that unlimited discovery would deter
the lawyer from reducing to writing much that should be recorded for
effective preparation. 5' With respect to the formal statements of wit-
nesses that could be used at trial for impeachment, this assumption
seems unpersuasive, since the need to tie the witnesses to one version
of a story would appear to outweigh any fear of discovery.5 2  Deter-
rence of written preparation would seem to be a more realistic fear,
however, with respect to a lawyer's mental impressions. By relying
on his memory, instead of committing his opinions to a memorandum,
a lawyer could avoid production of a writing which might reveal a def-
possibility of. . . encouragement of lazy preparation . . . . That possibility may exist
in a particular case, although we regard it as most improbable in this hotly contested
litigation." Id. at 281-82. Compare these holdings with the Hickman Court's list of
undesirable effects supposedly resulting from unrestricted discovery (e.g., much of what
is written would remain unwritten). See note 46 supra.
49. Developments 1029. See Taine, supra note 17, at 1063 ("danger that fear of
discovery will lead to the omission of important tasks ordinarily attended to by non-
attorneys and thus to a lowering of the level of trial preparation"); Comment, supra
note 39, at 475-76.
This justification finds some support in the Hickman opinion in that "inefficiency"
in trial preparation is one of the evils warned against. 329 U.S. at 511.
50. F. JAMES, CiviL PROCEDURE § 6.9, at 206 (1965); Cooper 1280-82.
51. Developments 1029. See Comment, supra note 39, at 475-76. There is a def-
inite basis for this position in the Hickman opinion. See note 46 supra.
Furthermore, if Hickman is read as distinguishing between written statements and
oral recollections, with greater protection from discovery afforded the latter, see 329
U.S. at 512-13, then that case may exacerbate the problem discussed in the text by
providing further disincentives for preserving statements in writing.
52. See F. JAMES, CIvm PROCEDUmR § 6.9, at 206 (1965); Cooper 1277-79.
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inite and detailed statement of his professional judgment. It would
be difficult, as a practical matter, to obtain such information from him
by means of deposition or written interrogatory with any degree of
certainty or precision.53 On the other hand, failure to reduce his im-
pressions to writing would very likely decrease the attorney's effi-
ciency.
A third rationale for the Hickman holding, propounded in the
'opinion itself, is a fear of the development of "sharp practices" 54 if
discovery were to remain unrestricted. It has been suggested that
these might include a lawyer's placement of misleading memoranda
in his own files for his opponent to discover 55 and a lawyer's denial
of the existence of evidence he had collected in preparation for litiga-
tion when he felt that his misstatement would not subsequently be de-
tected.5 1  Of course, the danger of unethical conduct exists in regard
to discovery of any type of information, not merely to that of trial prep-
aration materials; 57 however, to the extent that allowing discovery of
work product would make sharp practices more likely, perhaps the
potential for unethical conduct should be considered as a justification
for affording work product protection.
Though it is difficult to enunciate a single rationale for the Hick-
man holding, the justification most frequently invoked by the commen-
tators for protecting work product is that unrestricted discovery
would deter adequate preparation.58 This is a synthesis of the "deter-
53. If, for instance, a party were asked about his interpretation of the facts con-
cerning the matter in dispute, or asked about the version of the facts he would espouse
at trial, he could, in most cases, reply in good conscience that he had not yet decided
upon a particular interpretation. Thus, he could probably give some honest response
that would not give away his trial strategy. However, if a memorandum concerning
the matter had been written by the lawyer for his own benefit, there is no doubt that
his opponent could draw certain inferences from it as to his proposed plans for trial.
If the lawyer feared disclosure of such plans, it is unlikely that he would write the
memo.
Of course, if the opponent asked a direct question about a fact in the case, no
"evasive" answer would be available. However, the work product doctrine is intended
to protect the fruit of the attorney's labors, not the factual information intermingled
with it. See Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks: Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14
VAN. L. Rnv. 865, 868 (1961).
54. 329 U.S. at 511. But see Cooper 1276; Developments 1028. "Mhe rationale
for the work-product doctrine rests not so much on the fear of unfairness or sharp prac-
tices as on the desire to promote the effectiveness of the adversary system .... " Id.
55. See Cleary, supra note 53, at 869.
56. See Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Priv-
ilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part II), 42 U. DaT. L.J. 253, 269
(1965).
57. Cooper 1276.
58. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 56, at 268; Taine, mupra note 17, at 1042; Devel-
opments 1028-29.
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rence from adequate investigation" and the "deterrence from written
preparation" theories already discussed. However, it is possible to
formulate a broader proposition regarding Hickman which encom-
passes most of the possible rationales suggested here " and else-
where. 60 Such a proposition would be based on the observation that
all of the evils that are feared from unrestricted discovery can occur
only because the lawyer anticipates that his preparatory materials will
be discovered. That is, the Hickman Court suggested that if attorneys
know that their work product is subject to discovery, they will behave
in a manner necessarily harmful to the adversary system. Whether
this interference with the adversary process appears in the form of in-
adequate preparation or as "sharp practices" is not important here. It
is enough to realize that the consequences sought to be avoided would
occur because of what the lawyer anticipates at the time of prepara-
tion,61 and not as a result of discovery itself. 2 While this "rationale"
does nothing to advance the definition of what in fact constitutes work
product," it does set forth the theory upon which protection of pre-
paratory materials ought to be based, and this theory is sufficient to
provide the answer to the question of whether discovery of work prod-
uct should be allowed in subsequent litigation.
Discovery of Work Product in Subsequent Litigation
One of the unresolved issues relating to -the work product doc-
trine is whether protection from discovery should be extended to work
product generated in an earlier suit. 64 Before entering upon any dis-
59. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
60. Another negative result of unlimited discovery set forth in Hickman is the "de-
moralizing" effect on the legal profession. 329 U.S. at 511. Presumably this implies
that attorneys would be generally demoralized because they would be painfully aware
of the fact that whatever preparation they engaged in might not be capable of effective
utilization at trial, since their opponents would have access to their materials and could
counter any strategy that was planned.
61. It may be that most of the undesired consequences relate to preparation (I.e.,
they will occur at the time of preparation); however, not all of those consequences re-
flect inadequate preparation. For example, the sharp practices feared by the Court
would presumably take place during the preparation and discovery period, see notes 54-
57 supra and accompanying text, but they are not necessarily inconsistent with ade-
quate preparation.
62. For an example of a rationale for protecting work product based on supposed
direct effects of unrestricted discovery upon the trial process itself, see note 47 supra.
Whatever the merits of this approach, it is not the one adopted by the Hickman Court.
63. It is still necessary to determine those materials, discovery of which will cause
the undesired effects.
64. By way of introduction, it should be made clear that the issue of whether to
allow discovery of work product in litigation subsequent to that for which it was pre-
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cussion of the cases, however, it should be made clear that the Federal
Rules themselves do not provide any clear solution to this problem.
)Rule 26(b)(3),6 5 a codification of the Hickman case,66 affords pro-
tection to materials "prepared in anticipation of litigation." It could
be argued that "litigation" in the rule means only this litigation;67 that
is, only materials prepared specifically for the case at bar qualify for
work product protection. A second, somewhat more persuasive read-
ing of the rule is based on the longer clause "prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party."68 A literal interpreta-
tion of that clause would lead to two results. First, protection would
be extended only to an attorney representing a party-a participant
in the present suit. An "outside" attorney not involved in the litiga-
tion could be made to surrender all his relevant files. Second, if the
materials sought were prepared for a present party in anticipation of
earlier litigation, they would be protected. 69  However, these conclu-
pared has received little attention. Very few courts have dealt with the problem and
those that have, have given it only superficial consideration. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. An-
aconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
65. Rule 26(b)(3) states:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision(b) (4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the liti-
gation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning
the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request,
a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person.
If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The provi-
sions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation
to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a stalement previously made
is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other re-
cording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
66. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482 (4th
Cir. 1973); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2023, at 193. See generally Comment, supra note
14, at 1157-63.
67. See ThiU Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138 (E.D. Wis.
1972) ("I consider work product to be material prepared in preparation for this case,
not just material gathered with the knowledge that it might be used in some future liti-
gation.")
68. FD. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
69. See 8 WIuGrr & MILLm § 2024, at 201-02, & n.29.
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sions could lead to absurd results.70 Neither of the above interpreta-
tions has been seriously considered by the courts. Since the rule was
apparently drafted without consideration of the "subsequent litigation"
problem,"' the courts should base their decisions on Hickman. 2
When, the courts have been faced with this issue,73 they have
utilized three different approaches. Under the first approach, enunci-
ated in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.74 and
Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,75 discovery of materials pre-
pared in one suit is allowed without question in a later suit. In the
Honeywell case, which is typical of those involving the "subsequent
litigation" issue, plaintiff Honeywell sued Piper and another company
for patent infringement. In discovery, defendants sought a number
70. Suppose A and B brought separate suits against C on the same grounds. Un-
der the interpretation suggested in the text, C could effect discovery of A's attorney's
work product through discovery proceedings in the suit against B. Such a result is
clearly undesirable. Id. at 202.
71. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482 (4th
Cir. 1973). See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, supra note 37, at
499-503.
72. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482
(4th Cir. 1973).
73. Initially, one group of cases must be distinguished from the other cases dealing
with discovery of work product materials generated in prior litigation. These are cases
in which information sought to be discovered involves the behavior and conduct of the
attorney in the prior suit rather than facts related to substantive issues. In a typical
case, the insurer's attorney, representing a policy holder in tort litigation, fails to set-
tle within policy limits and then loses the case. The former defendant-policy holder
then sues to recover the excess of the judgment over the policy limit, claiming bad faith
on the part of the insurance company, and seeking discovery of correspondence between
the insurer and its attorneys. In such cases, discovery has universally been granted;
because it is very likely that the correspondence sought will be dispositive evidence in
the second suit, the requisite "substantial need" and "undue hardship" of rule 26(b) (3),
see note 65 supra, will invariably be found by the court. See, e.g., Bourget v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 1969); LaRocca v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D Pa. 1969); Kirkland v. Morton Salt
Co., 46 F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (suit for malicious use of process in garnishment
of debt allegedly paid in full); Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D.
37 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Consequently, the issue of whether the material is technically
work product for purposes of the second suit is unimportant.
74. 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962). In Hanover, the plaintiff brought an anti-
trust action against United Shoe seeking treble damages. In a previous case, an anti-
trust action by the United States against United Shoe, one of the defendant's lawyers
prepared a memorandum following a meeting in which the president of Hanover was
interviewed. In the second suit, plaintiff sought discovery of this memorandum and
defendant claimed work product protection. The court permitted discovery, stating that
[t]here is nothing in the Hickman case which extends the work product prin-
ciple to preclude discovery of a lawyer's memorandum, prepared during a
prior case, in a subsequent action between different parties. Id. at 410.
75. 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970). The Hanover and Honeywell cases were both
decided by Judge Sheridan.
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of documents related to prior patent interference cases (involving the
same patents) tried before the Board of Patent Interferences of the
United States. Although the plaintiff contended that the work product
privilege should apply, the court permitted discovery, simply stating
that "[t]here is no indication that the documents were prepared 'with
an eye toward litigation' involved in this suit."17 6  This approach rests
on too narrow an interpretation of the work product doctrine because
it grants discovery of all relevant materials to the complete exclusion
of the needs of the adversary system which the Hickman Court
deemed so -important. It is easy to imagine a situation in -which a
lawyer would anticipate attempted discovery, in future litigation, of his
present work product.1 7  If the attorney knows that discovery will be
freely allowed, the potential is present for the undesirable conse-
76. 50 F.R.D. at 119 (emphasis added). Although it may seem that this statement
indicates an adoption by the court of the interpretation of rule 26(b)(3) suggested
above, see note 67 supra and accompanying text, Honeywell was decided three days
before that rule was adopted.
The Honeywell court may have adopted its approach as a result of a misapplica-
tion of the holding of an earlier case dealing with a similar issue but distinguishable
on its facts. The earlier case, cited in both Hanover and Honeywell, was Tobacco &
Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1954). In that
case, the plaintiff's attorney had represented another client in previous litigation. Both
suits involved the same subject matter, and in both Transamerica was the defendant.
At the time of the previous action, however, the attorney in question had not yet been
retained by the plaintiff in the second suit. In the second suit, defendant sought pro-
duction of some of the attorney's correspondence in the first action. The court prop-
erly permitted discovery. Id. at 537. This seems consistent with the Hickman ration-
ale; the court's emphasis on the fact that the attorney had not been retained by the
plaintiff until after the termination of the first suit implies that had the attorney, in
fact, represented both clients at the time of the first suit, protection might have been
granted. But since this was not the case, the attorney could not have foreseen the sub-
sequent litigation. Therefore, he could not have anticipated discovery of his work
product in the second case, and no basis existed for granting work product protection.
In Hanover and Honeywell, however, the party from whom discovery was sought
had also been a party in the prior suit, and was represented by the same attorney in
both actions. Hence there was a possibility that the attorney might have foreseen his
involvement in the second suit, as part of his continuing representation of his client.
Judge Sheridan ignored that distinction in both cases and simply cited Transamerica
for the proposition that work product is not entitled to protection in subsequent litiga-
tion between different parties. 50 F.R.D. at 119, 207 F. Supp. at 410, respectively.
Note that the "different parties" in Hanover and Honeywell were the inquiring parties.
If the basis for protection depends upon the attorney's anticipation of discovery of his
work product, it appears to be irrelevant that "different parties" are doing the discover-
ing.
77. An attorney representing the defendant against one victim in a mass tort (e.g.,
an airline crash) might justifiably expect later suits brought by other victims or their
representatives. If so, and if the attorney feared discovery of his preparatory materials
in the later actions, he might be expected to adjust his method of preparation. See
Developments 1044.
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quences against which the Supreme Court has sought to guard. 78  The
approach taken by the courts in Hanover and Honeywell thus appears
to ignore the teaching of Hickman.
A second group of cases, impliedly recognizing the shortcomings
of the Hanover-Honeywell approach, has adopted a somewhat broader
analysis, extending work product protection to subsequent closely re-
lated cases. 79 That is, work product generated by an attorney in one
action will not be subject to discovery in a later action if the two suits
are closely related.80 Though not clearly enunciated, the justification
for this rule seems to be that the evils feared by the Hickman Court
are as likely to occur if discovery of work product is permitted in a
subsequent, related suit as if it were permitted in the original case.8 1
Therefore the Hickman rationale would justify extending protection to
work product in the "closely related" suit.
There are at least two difficulties inherent in this 'approach.
First, although -it has the advantage of flexibility, so that a trial judge
could make *a determination on the basis of the particular circum-
stances in each case, it lacks predictability because of the problem
of determining what is "closely related."8 2  If the outcome of an at-
tempt at discovery cannot be ascertained with some degree of certainty
at the time of preparation for the original suit, attorneys will be uncer-
tain as to future protection of their work and may very well adjust
78. See notes 32, 42-43, 46 supra and accompanying text.
79. Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.
Pa. 1967); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D. 520 (D. Colo.
1964).
80. Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[Mlaterials prepared for a prior litigation should not be discoverable in a later
case where the two actions are closely related."); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("That litigation is so closely
related to the present litigation that the work product privilege would ordinarily extend
to both.")
81. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D. 520 (D.
Colo. 1964), where the court stated:
Adversary counsel in an active case, obviously, should not normally be free
to force his opponent to reveal his strategy; but neither should counsel in a
closely related subsequent case, albeit between different parties in part, obtain
carte blanche to examine an attorney's files in the former case. Should dis-
covery of an attorney's work product in a former case ever be generally or
indiscriminately permitted counsel would undoubtedly feel constrained to leave
unwritten and unrecorded many of their impressions and plans which they
should feel free to reduce to writing. Id. at 522.
82. If the "closely related" test were applied to the facts of Honeywell, a patent
interference suit, the result would not be clear. If the same patent were involved in
both original and subsequent cases, but a different aspect of it were at issue, what re-
sult? If the patent were similar to the one involved in the prior case? There are many
variations in potential factual situations.
WORK PRODUCT DISCOVERY
their method of preparation; hence, the purpose of the work produot
doctrine will be frustrated.83
A second difficulty with the "closely related" approach is that
it may protect a lawyer's work product in situations where protection
seems unnecessary. This approach seems to be founded on the
premise that if a subsequent case is closely related, the attorney, while
preparing for the prior case, would likely have foreseen the possibility
of future demands for discovery. Accordingly, the consequences
sought to be avoided by the work product doctrine would flow natur-
ally from the lawyer's anticipation of discovery, unless he knew that
his work product would be granted protection from discovery. While
this assumption may be accurate -in many cases, it is not universally
true. In some situations where a second, "closely related" suit is in
fact litigated, the attorney may not 'have considered, at the time of
the first suit, the possibility of discovery in a second suit or even the
possibility of subsequent litigation; 8 or if he considered either, he
might have rejected those possibilities as too slight to concern him.
In either event, -the theoretical basis for work product protection would
disappear. In short, the mere fact that two successive cases85 are
83. It would seem, therefore, that predictability is more important than flexibility.
See 111-12 infra and accompanying text. This poses a question as to the validity of
the test proposed later in this Note. See notes 107, 110-12 infra and accompanying
text.
84. See note 76 supra.
85. What result if the first case has not yet been terminated? In Republic Gear
Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967), the plaintiff sought produc-
tion of documents generated by the attorney of two South American companies when
those companies were in the process of terminating their contracts with plaintiff Repub-
lic. Republic sought the documents to prove that defendant Borg-Warner had tortiously
interfered with those contracts. However, in an earlier suit by Republic against the
South American companies, these documents had been declared work product. The
previous suit was pending on appeal and, furthermore, as the court pointed out, the
South American companies might still be subject to suit in their own country. Id. at
557 & n.5. Under these circumstances, the court properly extended protection to the
attorney's work product since to allow discovery before the first suit was completed
would defeat the purpose of the doctrine.
One prerequisite to protection in a case like Republic Gear, where the "prior" ac-
tion has not been terminated, is that the interests of the client whose attorney's work
product is being sought must be adverse to those of the inquiring party. See Note,
The Attorney's Trial Preparation and Pre-Trial Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 62
HARV. L. Rv. 269, 274 (1948); cf. Shields v. Sobelman, 64 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa.
1946). It is clear that the interests in Republic were adverse since the inquiring party
might still have sued the person seeking protection.
"Adverseness" in this context should not be equated with legal adverseness; that
is, the persons seeking and objecting to discovery or those in privity with them should
not have to be parties on opposing sides of the same lawsuit for protection to be avail-
able. If there is any significant danger that the material sought will be disclosed to
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closely related should not -warrant automatic protection in the second
suit of work product generated in the first.80
The third approach, recently propounded in Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz,8" represents the broadest appli-
cation of the work product doctrine to discovery in subsequent litiga-
tion. In Duplan, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the work product of an attorney is protected from discovery in
all subsequent litigation. Though the facts of the case are not clear, 83
they are relatively unimportant in light of the court's view of the case.
At the outset, the court framed the issue as
whether upon the termination of litigation the work product documents
prepared incident thereto lose the qualified immunity extended to them
the adversary of the document producer, it should be protected unless some other safe-
guards can be taken. See Note, supra at 274. This conclusion is consistent with the
.Hickman rationale in that a "strict" standard of adverseness might not cover all situa-
tions in which an attorney might reasonably anticipate discovery of his work product.
86. On the other hand, the "closely related" test may also be too narrow in some
respects. One can imagine a situation in which a lawyer does in fact anticipate discov-
ery in a second suit which is not closely related to the first. Suppose such a lawyer
represented a client who anticipated that he might be involved in two wholly unrelated
lawsuits. Further suppose that in preparation solely for the first suit, the attorney
wrote a short memorandum, perhaps for the benefit of his partner who would actually
try the case, stating why he thought his client could easily be impeached as a witness
at trial and the grounds for such impeachment. Certainly, opposing counsel in the sec-
ond, unrelated suit would want to discover such a memorandum. Though it would not be
admissible to impeach, it would be of great assistance in preparing his case. If the attor-
ney who wrote the memorandum had considered the possibility of such discovery, he
might have relied on his memory to inform his partner, at the sacrifice of efficient
preparation.
87. 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973).
88. The original litigation involved patent disputes between the defendant, a
French corporation, and Leesona, a Massachusetts corporation, 487 F.2d at 481 n.2.
The prior litigation ceased in 1964 when Leesona and defendant negotiated a "treaty."
See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 703, 708 (D.S.C. 1971).
Duplan-Chavanoz arose out of a patent-antitrust suit brought by a group of "throw-
sters" (the name relates to the type of machine involved in the patent litigation) al-
legedly aggrieved by certain patent licensing agreements between the defendant and its
agents in South Carolina; evidently, the same patents were involved. The above history
can be distilled from the following cases: Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie
de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 353 F. Supp.
826 (D.S.C. 1973); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 703 (D.S.C.
1971).
It is clear that Chavanoz at least had an argument that the litigation from which
work product was sought to be discovered met the "closely related" test. See Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 127, 132-33 (D.S.C. 1973). Since neither
the district nor the appellate court ruled on this issue, future litigants may attempt to
avoid the Duplan rule by arguing that the case's result (though not its holding) could
have been reached under the less expansive "closely related" rule. See notes 79-86
supra and accompanying text.
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under Rule 26(b)(3), . . . and become freely discoverable in subse-
quent and unrelated litigation.8 9
After noting the general confusion regarding the Hickman doctrine,
the court set out its own view of the justification for work product
protection. Utilizing several quotations from Hickman, the Fourth Cir-
cuit strongly emphasized the importance of a lawyer's privacy: "IThe
thrust of the [Hickman] decision was the qualified protection of the
the . . . confidentiality and activity of an attorney which transcends
the rights of the litigants." 9  Admittedly -aware of "divergent con-
clusions reached in similar cases," the court simply maintained that
these cases had "misread the basic teaching of Hickman."91  In par-
ticular, the court noted that some courts did apply the "closely related"
test, but the court felt that "to dispose of this delicate and important
question by such a technical touchstone is incompatible with the essen-
tial basis of the Hickman decision."92  Therefore, the court reversed
the district court9" and held that the "qualified immunity of work pro-
duct materials"9" was to be recognized in all subsequent litigation.
The Duplan decision is important for several reasons. First, it
is the most recent federal case dealing with the problem of discovery
of a lawyer's work product in subsequent litigation. Second, it is one
of the few cases that have reached the courts of appeals on this issue.95
89. 487 F.2d at 481.
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id. at 484.
92. Id. at 484 n.15.
93. The district court had applied the Hanover-Honeywell rule which it found to
represent the clear weight of authority:
(1) [W]hen a case in litigation is finally terminated; (2) by either a decision
of the court or by settlement among the parties; (3) the work product priv-
ilege is also terminated; and (4) the work product of attorneys in the prior
litigation is therefore subject to discovery in subsequent litigation. Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 127, 135 (D.S.C. 1973).
94. 487 F.2d at 484.
95. Duplan is only the second case dealing with the issue to reach a federal appel-
late court. The other case, Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551
(2d Cir. 1967), is discussed in note 85 supra.
Few discovery cases reach the courts of appeals because interlocutory orders are
not appealable under the final order doctrine. See generally Note, Discovery: Work
Product and Good Cause Development since "Hickman v. Taylor," 36 INn. L.i. 186,
201 (1960). An appeal was possible in Hickman only because counsel refused to obey
the district court's order for production and was cited for criminal contempt, which is
an appealable final order. Congress subsequently passed the Interlocutory Appeals Act
of 1958 which gives the appellate court discretion to review an interlocutory order
when a district judge
shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the litigation .... 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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Finally, -it is also one of only a few opinions which undertake any
significant analysis of the Hickman rationale."' The Duplan court's
analysis produced a somewhat unusual view of the work product doc-
trine,9 7 in which the purpose of the doctrine is to protect something
inherently sacred in the lawyer's preparatory materials, rather than to
prevent the potentially injurious consequences flowing from the attor-
ney's anticipation of unlimited discovery. While some of the language
used by Justice Murphy arguably supports such an interpretation of
the rationale underlying the work product doctrine, 8 this approach
misreads the basic teaching of Hickman. For if it is assumed that at-
torney privacy is the foundation of the doctrine, the next logical ques-
tion must be why it is especially important to protect an attorney's pri-
vacy. The answer, of course, is that protection is necessary to avoid
the consequences which the Supreme Court presumed would follow
from the lawyer's -anticipation of unrestricted discovery. 9 The Duplan
case goes far beyond what is necessary to obviate the feared ill effects,
for it would provide protection to material which was prepared by an
Duplan reached the appellate level because the district judge certified his order for
interlocutory consideration pursuant to this provision and the Fourth Circuit granted
the appeal. 487 F.2d at 481.
96. The district court in Duplan devoted considerable space to the subsequent liti-
gation issue, but its analysis was based primarily on the available precedent, rather than
on the rationale underlying Hickman. See 61 F.R.D. at 130-35.
97. There is, however, one earlier case with a holding similar to Duplan, LaRocca
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969). LaRocca involved
a suit by a tortfeasor against his insurer to recover damages resulting from failure to
settle the claim against him within the limits of his policy. LaRocca successfully
sought discovery of correspondence between the insurer and its attorney. See note 73
supra. He also sought discovery of the file of the atttorney of the plaintiff in the ear-
lier case. In a supplemental opinion, discovery of this file was denied apparently on
reasoning similar to that of Duplan. Id. at 281-82.
This latter holding of LaRocca seems to have been overlooked by the Duplan court
since LaRocca is cited as having a "divergent conclusion." 487 F.2d at 484 & n.15.
That description could only apply to the successful discovery of insurer-attorney cor-
respondence.
98. "It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to pre-
clude unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work." 329 U.S. at 497.
"Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure writ-
ten statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by
an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties." Id. at 510. "[lt is es-
sential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy. . . ." Id.
99. See notes 32, 42-43, 46 supra and accompanying text. A passage later in the
opinion gives an indication that privacy itself is not the primary consideration. In con-
cluding that petitioner's counsel had not shown "good cause," the Court said, "That
is insufficient under the circumstances to permit him an exception to the policy under-
lying the privacy of Fortenbaugh's professional activities." 329 U.S. at 513 (emphasis
added). The "policy underlying" the need to protect attorney privacy is the prevention
of injuries to the adversary system.
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attorney without any fear that it might be the object of discovery in
a later case. While the Duplan approach would certainly provide pro-
tection when it is required, it must be rejected because the policy of
free discovery demands that work product protection 'be limited as
much as possible.loa
What influence Duplan will have on other courts is yet to be de-
termined. 10 1 Perhaps the more interesting and more important in-
quiry is what effect Duplan will have on the answers to other questions
about the work product privilege. An adoption of the interpretation
of Hickman espoused in Duplan could mark a "step backward to the
antiquated and atavistic values of the common law,"' 0 unduly circum-
scribing the policy of liberal discovery embodied in the Federal Rules.
A Proposed Test
Having examined the Hickman rationale and its application by
the courts to cases involving the discovery of work product in subse-
quent litigation, it is now appropriate to propose a test for deciding
whether to afford protection in such cases, one that is hopefully more
consistent with that rationale than those the courts have thus far de-
veloped. Since the rationale is prospective in nature-it focuses on
the attorney's expectations at the time of the initial litigation-it
should be possible to formulate an objective test which maximizes the
importance of the predictability of subsequent litigation as the major
element of that test. 03
The first approach adopted .by the courts, 104 allowing discovery
in all subsequent litigation, though certainly predictable, is unsatis-
factory because it does not purport to protect against the evils en-
visioned by Hickman. The second approach, 0 5 the "closely related"
test, is deficient in predictablity because it is an after-the-fact test. It
100. See Note, supra note 85, at 274.
101. Even if it is assumed that the Duplan decision is wrong, it may have salutary
effects if it induces the courts to give more thought to the applicability of the Hickman
rationale to the problem of discovery of work product in subsequent litigation.
102. LaFrance, supra note 14, at 371. This statement was made in the context of
a discussion critical of the Hickman doctrine, but since Duplan is an arguably unwar-
ranted extension of Hickman, see notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text, the criti-
cism is equally applicable to Duplan.
103. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text. If the attorney anticipates fu-
ture litigation and future discovery, unwanted consequences will presumably ensue. If
it is desired to prevent these consequences, it would be necessary for the attorney to
be able to determine, with reasonable certainty, that discovery would not be allowed
in a foreseeable future case.
104. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 79-86 supra and accompanying text.
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evaluates the relationship between the initial and subsequent litigation
from a retrospective standpoint, rather than from the point of view
of -an attorney involved in the earlier suit who must decide whether
his work product will be protected in the future. Furthermore, the
"closely related" standard is 'both over-inclusive and under-inclusive
with respect to those cases in which Hickman suggests that work pro-
duct protection is warranted. Finally, the third approach, 00 affording
protection in all cases, may be criticized because it seems based on
a misinterpretation of the Hickman rationale, and, in many cases, pro-
tects an attorney's work product from discovery when no protection
is needed.
Accordingly, the best solution seems to be a "reasonable attorney"
standard. The appropriate question would then be: Under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the preparation of the initial suit, would
there have been in the mind of a reasonable attorney a belief that
,there was a substantial probability of significant subsequent litigation
to which 'his present work product would be relevant?' 0 7  The merits
of this test are apparent. First, this is a flexible rule in that it allows
the trial judge to look at the circumstances of each case to determine
whether the situation is one in which work product protection would
be appropriate. In this respect, it is superior to both the Hanover-
Honeywell and Duplan approaches which lay down rigid rules.
Further, the reasonable attorney standard is more faithful to the
Hickman rationale than the other approaches. Like Hickman,10 8 it
focuses on the attorney's expectations at the time of preparation. If
the circumstances are such that a reasonable attorney would anticipate
that his preparatory materials might be subject to discovery in the fu-
ture, protection will be granted. 10 9  Thus, the proposed test is solici-
tous of the need to maintain the efficacy of the adversary system. At
the same time, it does not provide blanket protection, as does Duplan,
which might undermine the free discovery policy of the Federal Rules.
However, there are two potential flaws in the reasonable attorney
106. See notes 87-102 supra and accompanying text.
107. Note that the test does not ask whether the reasonable attorney would alter
his method of preparation. The test assumes, as does Hickman, that if the attorney
anticipates discovery of his preparatory materials, undesirable consequences will occur.
See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
109. On the other hand, if the reasonable attorney would not have anticipated the
possibility of future discovery, all protection would be refused, since there would be
no reason for granting it, according to the rationale of Hickman. The result would
be that rule 26(b)(3) would not apply at all, and even the attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories would be subject to discovery.
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standard. First, the results which the -test would yield in a given case
might not be clearly predictable. 110 An attorney who considers the
problem must assess the situation and determine whether a reasonable
attorney would anticipate subsequent litigation. A cautious attorney
might "anticipate" subsequent litigation in nearly every case, and if
he were unsure of the availability of protection in some instances be-
cause of the indefiniteness of the proposed standard, undesired conse-
quences might ensue. Would not the predictable blanket protection
of the Duplan rule then be preferable, even at the sacrifice of the
policy objectives underlying liberal discovery provisions? The fact is
that in most cases the attorney will not consider the potential for future
discovery in a second suit, because the circumstances simply will not
suggest the possibility of subsequent litigation. And if the problem
does not occur to the attorney, the evils feared in Hickman will not
result. Moreover, since those relatively infrequent instances where
the attorney is concerned about subsequent litigation will be obvious
from the factual context of the case,'11 the attorney will -usually be
able to conclude that a reasonable attorney would also anticipate
future litigation. Thus, the lack of predictability inherent in the rea-
sonable attorney standard appears tolerable.- 2
A second problem with the reasonable attorney approach is that
it may afford protection to some preparatory materials when no protec-
tion is necessary. Consider the case of the attorney who, applying the
proposed objective test, erroneously believed -that his work product
110. However, even the Duplan approach does not afford protection that is perfectly
predictable; the possibility remains that the discovering party will be able to make the
requisite "good cause" showing under rule 26(b)(3) to override work product protec-
tion, and a lawyer might adjust his preparation because of this uncertainty.
111. The factual situation in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962), see note 74 supra, is an excellent example of cir-
cumstances suggesting subsequent litigation. Whenever the United States brings an an-
titrust action against a company, the defendant company's lawyers can very likely ex-
pect subsequent damage actions by the company's competitors if the government wins
the suit.
From this example it may seem that the proposed test will afford work product
protection in the later litigation only where the cases are "closely related." Generally
this will be true. Consider again, however, the situation suggested in note 86 supra.
And of course the reasonable attorney standard will allow discovery in situations where
the "closely related" test may not. Consider the facts of Tobacco Allied Stocks, Inc.
v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1954), discussed in note 76 supra.
112. The objection of unpredictability was previously raised as a fault of the
"closely related" test. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text. The principal
difficulty with that test is that its focal point-relatedness-is imperfectly related to
the appropriate rationale for granting protection. The proper focus is on the issue of
the attorney's anticipation of subsequent discovery. See notes 107-09 supra and accom-
panying text.
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would not receive future protection, yet did not allow that belief to
affect his conduct. Why should this attorney's materials be protected
when there was little danger that the evils sought to be avoided would
occur? The short answer is that Hickman itself would protect that
attorney's preparation materials in an analogous situation.'13 Both
Hickman and the reasonable attorney test presume that if the attor-
ney fears discovery of his work product, undesired consequences will
follow.1 4 There may be instances, however, where it can be "objec-
tively" determined that a reasonable attorney, though he fully antici-
pated a subsequent suit, would not change his conduct in the first suit.
This might be the case when the monetary or precedential importance
of the first suit far overshadowed that of the contemplated second suit.
Hence, the justification for including in the proposed test the require-
nent of anticipation of significant subsequent litigation. If the reason-
able attorney would not, for some "objective" reason, attach signifi-
cance to the anticipated subsequent suit, knowledge that his work
product might later be discovered would not likely result in undesired
consequences, and therefore his preparatory materials should not re-
ceive work product protection.
Conclusion
The test proposed here for determining when protection from dis-
covery should be afforded to an attorney's work product from prior
'litigation can be easily integrated into the analytic framework sug-
gested by the Hickman opinion."15 Recall that on one side of the bal-
ancing scales is the need to protect the adversary system from the in-
jurious consequences which the Hickman Court assumed would result
if an attorney anticipates free discovery of his work product. The
Court in Hickman implicitly indulged the further assumption that an
attorney would always anticipate the possibility of discovery of his
work product in the suit for which it was prepared. This assumption
is not relevant where the work product was prepared for a suit dif-
ferent from the one in which discovery is being sought. However,
it seems fair to infer that a corollary of this proposition is that an at-
torney who antitcipates litigation will also anticipate discovery. The
test proposed by this Note then asks if an attorney would have anti-
cipated further related litigation, and thus discovery, at the time he
113. The "analogous situation" would occur if an attorney who knew that his pre-
paratory materials would be discoverable in the case at hand did not allow the potential
of discovery to affect his preparation.
114. See notes 46, 107 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
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prepared the work product in question. An affirmative answer to this
inquiry is functionally equivalent to the Hickman Court's assumption
that an attorney would expect discovery of his work product in the
suit for which it was prepared. When coupled with the Court's finding
that anticipation of discovery of work product leads to injury to the
adversary system, the outcome of the proposed test determines the
weight to be attached to the interest in affording work product protec-
tion, which must then be balanced against the interest in allowing lib-
eral discovery. The weight of this latter interest will vary with the
need of the discovering party for the information, as revealed by the
"good cause" showing that he must make under rule 26(b) (3) when
the interest in favor of work product protection is at stake.
Most importantly, the standard here proposed is concordant with
the fundamental rationale and spirit of the Hickman case. By focusing
on the attorney's expectations at the time of preparation for litigation,
this standard recognizes the need of the adversary system for counsel
confident that the fruit of his labors will not be freely available to his
opponent, while ensuring the freest possible interchange of informa-
tion between litigants consistent with this objective, thereby engender-
ing maximum progress toward what should be the ultimate goal of all
courts in procedural decisions-effecting just and efficient resolution
of disputes through the legal process.
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